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Abstract 
We assess the sustainability of public finances in OECD countries using panel unit root and 
cointegration analyses. Results show: no cointegration (no sustainability) between revenues and 
expenditures; improvement of the primary balances after worsening debt ratios; causality from 
government debt to primary balances. 
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1. Introduction  
The importance of sustainable public finances has received increasing attention following the 
2008-2009 financial crisis. Sustainable fiscal policies can be continued, theoretically without 
changes in the policy stance, while the intertemporal government budget constraint holds. 
Conversely, if budgetary imbalances prevail, changes would be required, implying larger 
economic adjustments.  
We investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy in a panel of 18 OECD countries in the 
period 1970-2010. We use stationarity analysis of the first-differenced stock of government debt 
and assess cointegrating between government revenues and expenditures, and between primary 
balances and debt, derived from the intertemporal government budget constraint. These 
approaches provide an indirect test on the solvency of public finances. 
Our results suggest that long-run causality runs from lagged debt to primary balance, but on 
average the marginal long-run impact is zero. We cannot say that fiscal policy has been 
sustainable for most countries in our sample. 
          
2. Theoretical Framework  
A sustainable fiscal policy should ensure that the present value of the stock of public debt 
goes to zero in infinity, constraining the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate (no 
Ponzi game). Recalling the Present Value Budget Constraint, it is possible to present 
analytically two definitions of sustainability suitable for empirical testing (Hamilton and Flavin, 
1986): 
i) The value of current public debt equals the sum of future primary surpluses; 
ii) The present value of public debt approaches zero in infinity. 
To test the absence of Ponzi games, we inspect the stationarity of the first difference of the 
stock of debt, tB , and cointegration between primary balance, s, and the (lagged) stock of the 
public debt, tB  (Bohn, 2007):  
ttt uBs  1  (1) 
This “backward-looking” approach implies that past increases in the level of debt would 
imply larger primary balances today. Such relationship has been mentioned in the context of the 
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level and the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian fiscal 
regimes. 
It is also possible to assess sustainability through cointegration between government 
revenues, tR , and expenditures, tGG . The implicit hypothesis concerning the real interest rate is 
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also stationarity. With the no-Ponzi game condition, tGG  and tR  must be co-integrated 
variables of order one for their first differences to be stationary. The procedure involves testing 
the following cointegrating regression: 
 ttt uGGR    (2) 
and if the null of no co-integration is rejected, tu  must be stationary.  
  
3. Methodology and Results 
 There has been a fair amount of empirical studies on fiscal sustainability notably for the US 
and Europe (Feve and Henin, 2000; Afonso, 2005; Camarero et al., 2014). However, given the 
low power of individual country-by-country tests, it may be preferable to pool the time series 
and conduct panel analysis, also justified by the economic and financial integration of the 
economies and their interdependences.  
We implement two panel unit root tests: first generation tests, the Im et al. (2003) test (IPS) 
and second generation tests – Cross-Sectionally Augmented Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS test). 
The latter tests account for cross-sectional dependence of the contemporaneous error terms 
(Pesaran, 2007). 
The outcome for the full sample is as follows: the null hypothesis of unit roots for the panel 
for debt, total government expenditures, revenues and the primary balance cannot be rejected 
with the variables in levels (results available upon request). 
Therefore, we implement the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (2004), residual-
based tests for the null of no cointegration in heterogeneous panels. Two classes of statistics are 
considered. The first is based on pooling the residuals of the regression along the within-
dimension of the panel; the second is based on pooling the residuals of the regression along the 
between-dimension of the panel.  
Table 1 shows the outcomes of the cointegration between total government revenues and 
expenditures and the primary balance and (lagged) debt.
1
 We use four within-group tests and 
three between-group tests to check panel cointegration. The columns labelled within-dimension 
contain the computed value of the statistics based on estimators that pool the autoregressive 
coefficient across different countries for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals. The 
columns labelled between-dimension report the computed value of the statistics based on 
estimators that average individually calculated coefficients for each country. Both results show 
_____________________________ 
1
 In terms of data, expenditure (1.0.319.0.UUTGF), revenue (1.0.319.0.URTGF), debt (1.0.319.0.UDGGF) and 
primary balance (1.0.319.0.UBLGI) come from AMECO database for EU countries plus OECD for the remainder. 
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that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. Therefore, the relationships 
identified in (1) and (2) are cointegrated for the panel of the country sample. 
[Table 1] 
 
Assuming that government revenues and expenditures (government debt and primary 
balance) are cointegrated, we estimate the cointegrating coefficients to investigate the long-run 
relationship. We apply the between-dimension panel fully modified OLS (FMOLS) (Pedroni, 
2000).
2
 Individual estimates and standard errors for 0 : 0iH    in (1) and (2) are reported also 
for the panel. 
For the pool of all countries taken together we get 0.51 and 0.03 (statistically significant at 
the 1% level) for the revenues-expenditures and primary balance-debt relationships, respectively 
(Table 2). In general, the results point to a positive long-run co-movement between the levels of 
government revenues and expenditures. On the second relationship, the average result points to 
solvency, although, a country-by-country inspection shows that only Australia, Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and the UK present significant positive coefficient estimates for 
the improvement of the primary balance after past debt increases. 
[Table 2] 
 
If in each country tR and tGG  are individually non-stationary but together are cointegrated, 
we know from the Granger representation theorem that these series can be represented in the 
form of a dynamic error correction model: 
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ˆˆˆˆ   is the disequilibrium term and represents how far our variables are 
from the equilibrium relationship and the error correction mechanism estimates how this 
disequilibrium causes the variables to adjust towards equilibrium. Moreover, at least one of the 
adjustment coefficients i1  or i2 must be non-zero if a long-run relationship between the 
variables holds. A test for the significance of i1 ( i2 ) for any country can be interpreted as 
_____________________________ 
2
 In the presence of unit roots, the effect of superconsistency may not dominate the endogeneity effect of regressors 
if OLS is employed. FMOLS takes care of the endogeneity problem and provides unbiased estimates of the 
coefficients, which can be interpreted as long-run elasticities. 
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whether shocks in government expenditures (revenues) have a long-run effect on government 
revenues (expenditures) and testing the sign of the ratio ii 21 / can be interpreted as a test of 
the sign of the long-run effect of shocks to government expenditures on revenues. 
In practice, we use both group mean based tests and lambda-Pearson based tests. The 
combination of the two can be particularly informative when the underlying parameters of 
interest are heterogeneous. For instance, when 
1
t fails to reject he null while 
1
P  succeeds in 
rejecting the null, this can be interpreted as a situation in which we do not reject that the average 
value for i1 is zero, even though we reject that it is pervasively zero in the panel.  
 [Table 3] 
 
In Table 3 panel A, the i1 parameters reported indicate that long-run causality that does not 
run from expenditures to revenues (p-values above 10%). This supports the non-validity of the 
“Spend and Tax” hypothesis, meaning that fiscal authorities are not able to generate the 
revenues required to finance planned expenditures. Turning to i2 , we reject the hypothesis that 
revenues have a zero average long-run effect globally (group mean tests) on spending. The 
results hold pervasively among individual countries and on average for the entire panel (based 
on the group-mean and Lamba-Pearson tests). The implication of these results is that changes in 
revenues induce permanent changes in long-run expenditures, the average marginal long-run 
impact being zero.  
In Table 3 panel B, from the i1 parameters we conclude that long-run causality runs from 
lagged debt to the primary balance (p-values below 10%). The results hold among individual 
countries and on average for the entire panel. Turning to i2 , we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that primary balances have a zero average long-run effect globally (group mean tests). At the 
same time, the sign of the effect is mixed, so that the average is still zero. Again, the average 
marginal long-run impact is zero. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We revisited the issue of fiscal policy sustainability in a sample of OECD countries using a 
panel approach. Results suggest a positive long-run co-movement between the levels of 
government revenues and expenditures, with changes in revenues inducing permanent changes 
in long-run expenditures. Although long-run causality runs from lagged debt to primary 
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balances, the average marginal long-run impact is zero. Overall, fiscal policy has been 
unsustainable. 
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Table 1: Panel cointegration tests 
 
 relation Revenues and 
Expenditures 
(lagged) Debt and Primary 
Balance 
(lagged) Debt-mean deviation 
and Primary Balance 
  No trend Trend No trend Trend No trend Trend 
Within-
dimension 
Panel v  3.42 1.15 5.29 2.85 5.12 2.85 
Panel   -2.93* -1.82* -3.98* -3.48* -3.78* -3.4* 
Panel PP -2.61* -2.87* -3.07* -3.83* -2.92* -3.74* 
Panel ADF -2.51* -2.75* -1.72 -1.91 -1.72 -1.92 
Between-
dimension 
Group   -1.80 -0.55 -2.91* -1.58 -2.89* -1.57 
Group PP -2.50* -2.48* -2.86* -3.15* -2.81* -3.12* 
Group 
ADF 
-2.51* -3.17* -1.81 -1.80 -1.93 -1.83 
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. An asterisk (*) indicates rejection at the 10% level or better. 
 
 
Table 2: Panel estimates of the cointegrating relationship (FMOLS) 
 
Country\relation Revenues, Expenditures (lagged) Debt, Primary Balance (lagged) Debt-mean deviation, Primary Balance 
   t-statistic   t-statistic   t-statistic 
Australia 0.60** 2.47 0.17*** 4.59 0.05 0.91 
Austria 0.69*** 14.98 0.03* 1.98 0.08*** 5.14 
Belgium 0.30* 1.80 0.11*** 5.16 0.15** 3.58 
Canada 0.35** 2.34 0.02 0.55 0.09** 2.22 
Denmark 0.63*** 4.78 -0.06 -1.51 -0.01 -0.24 
Finland 0.68*** 10.01 0.05 1.25 0.01 0.95 
France 0.69*** 14.25 0.00 0.12 0.06** 2.72 
Germany 0.53*** 6.50 0.08** 3.66 0.11** 3.68 
Greece 0.67*** 6.54 0.04 0.69 0.11** 3.10 
Ireland 0.40** 2.65 0.07** 2.57 0.07*** 4.94 
Italy -0.14 -0.45 0.01 0.37 -0.04* -2.19 
Japan 0.52*** 4.28 -0.03 -3.15 0.06 1.45 
Netherlands 0.65*** 16.06 0.05* 1.59 0.04* 1.63 
Portugal 0.84** 11.87 0.01 0.48 -0.00 -0.07 
Spain 0.76*** 9.85 0.01 0.17 0.09 1.23 
Sweden 0.50*** 5.52 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.56 
UK 0.34** 3.36 0.07* 1.83 -0.01 -0.17 
US 0.24 1.52 -0.00 -0.07 0.04 1.23 
Panel 0.51*** 27.93 0.03*** 4.76 0.05*** 7.22 
The regressions estimated correspond to Eq. (1) and (2) in the main text. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 3: Panel Long-run Causality 
 
Panel A:  
itit RGG :1  itit
GGR :2  21
/  
 Estimate Test p-value Estimate Test p-value median 
Group mean 0.14 0.24 0.60 0.34 2.31 0.01 -0.55 
Lamba-Pearson  47.35 0.10  145.39 0.00 0.42 
Panel B:  
itit sB 11 :  12
:  itit Bs  21
/  
 Estimate Test p-value Estimate Test p-value median 
Group mean 0.66 1.56 0.06 -0.42 -1.18 0.12 0.97 
Lamba-Pearson  104.58 0.00  90.64 0.00 0.41 
 Panel A: causality between government revenues and expenditures. Panel B: causality between (lagged) public debt and 
primary balance. In each panel there are two rows, one for the group mean based test, and one for the lambda-Pearson based 
test. See also the text for details. 
 
 
